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VIOLENCE AMIDST VIRUS: A GAME-THEORETIC EXPLORATION
OF CONFLICT DURING A PANDEMIC
Abstract. This paper explores how the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting conflicts world-
wide. On one hand, confrontation would expose both states and violent non-state groups
to contamination, potentially causing massive loss of human lives. Moreover, attacks
aimed at signalling discontent or making bigger demands, are unlikely to generate media
and diplomatic attention at the level it otherwise would have, sans the pandemic. Hence
there might be a mitigation in the intensity of conflicts. On the other hand, the capacity
of the states to retaliate will, to a large extent, be compromised, since huge financial and
human resources will have to be dedicated to fighting the widespread health and eco-
nomic effects of the pandemic. Hence the belligerent groups may have greater incentive
to launch attacks. This paper attempts to game-theoretically study these various issues
and incentives facing the conflicting parties, under the threat of COVID-19. We con-
sider the simple conflict model by Hirshleifer (2) and augment it by introducing possible
effects that a raging pandemic might impose on the conflicting parties. Specifically, we
introduce positive and negative externalities that a pandemic may impose on an exist-
ing conflict and explore parametric conditions under which it is likely to aggravate or
mitigate. We find that conflicts are generally likely to lessen but may increase under
specific circumstances. We present some narrative evidence on how conflicts seem to
have ameliorated in a pandemic-stricken world.
1. Introduction
“The fury of the virus illustrates the folly of war”. (UN Secretary-General
Anto´nio Guterres, March 23 2020)
The current COVID-19 pandemic has ushered in a paradigm shift in our thinking and pre-
dictions about almost all events, including conflicts. On one hand, confrontation would
expose both states and violent non-state groups to contamination, potentially causing mas-
sive loss of human lives. Moreover, attacks aimed at signalling discontent or making bigger
demands, are unlikely to generate media and diplomatic attention at the level it otherwise
would have, sans the pandemic. Hence there might be a mitigation in the intensity of con-
flicts. On the other hand, the capacity of the states to retaliate will, to a large extent, be
compromised, since huge financial and human resources will have to be dedicated to fighting
the widespread health and economic effects of the pandemic. Hence the belligerent groups
may have greater incentive to launch attacks. This paper attempts to broadly study these
various issues and incentives facing the conflicting parties, under the threat of COVID-19.
In a recent journalistic account, the apprehensions were well expressed by the following:
Syria, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, the Sahel... with the great powers fo-
cused intently on the COVID-19 virus, will armed conflicts across the world
1
2decrease in the severity or intensify? Experts, as well as diplomats at the
United Nations, say there is a serious risk of the latter1.
They go on to explain the reason for why diplomats and experts fear an increase in con-
flicts - when governments, and international organizations are all preoccupied managing the
outbreak of a pandemic of such proportions, the level of diplomatic attention and potential
retaliation to incidences of violence, will be seriously compromised to say the least. Inci-
dences of violence that would otherwise have drawn widespread international criticism and
condemnation, are likely to generate lesser attention and flak, now that greater perils are to
be dealt with.
For guerrilla fighters and extremist groups, “it’s a clear godsend,” said
Bertrand Badie, a specialist in international relations at France’s Institute
Political Studies (Sciences Po)2.
Other scholars have had similar apprehensions (see Yu¨ksel et al. (6), for example) that many
conflictual situations will see an aggravation in conflict. However, contrary to apprehensions,
not all violent conflicts in the world have aggravated and in fact, in some instances, there
has been a definite move towards its amelioration. In a long-standing conflict in Yemen,
Saudi-Arabia has called for a ceasefire. An India-China standoff along the border got settled
non-violently. And Israel, has for the time being deferred its plan for annexation of parts of
Palestine.
In this paper, we consider the potential impact of a pandemic on conflict and explore para-
metric conditions under which a conflict is likely to aggravate and those under which it is
likely to mitigate. We consider the simple conflict model by Hirshleifer (2) and augment
it by introducing possible effects that a raging pandemic might impose on the conflicting
parties. The way we do so is as follows: conflict under a pandemic can potentially pose two
kinds of externality - positive and negative.
Negative externality involves any and all kind of spread of disease in one’s own territory that
are brought about by engagement with one’s opponent (and appropriation of an aggregate,
part of which is contributed by the opponent). On the other hand, since the opponent also
suffers from the same fate of having to cope with the disease and has possibly invested in
medical supplies, R& D to develop vaccines, etc. in fighting the disease, appropriation of its
resources would mean gaining access to some of those as well. In other words, other than
1 “Will coronavirus slow the world’s conflicts or intensify them?” AFP, United Nations, March 22 2020,
https : //www.deccanherald.com/international/will − coronavirus − slow − the − worlds − conflicts −
or − intensify − them− 816448.html. (Accessed on July 14 2020)
2Ibid reference in footnote (1).
3what usual conflict involved, there is now the possibility of both a good and a bad spillover
occurring.
We find that under most of the parametric restrictions, conflict is likely to have fallen below
pre-pandemic days, though it could increase in certain cases. We discuss some narrative
evidence on cases where conflicts have fallen post-pandemic like in Yemen and along the
India-China border recently.
1.1. Related Literature. From a general perspective, this paper would fall within the
purview of the literature looking at various kinds of conflicts. To the extent that it relates
to issues of spill-over in conflict, it resonates closely with the huge literature on terrorism,
especially those that look at transnational terrorism, having cross-country spillovers (see
Sequeira and Sandler (4), for example or Chang et. al. (1) which explores conditions under
which ‘territorial conflict between two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely’).
From a modelling perspective, it directly builds on Hirshleifer’s (2) model and uses standard
political economic tools (see Persson and Tabellini (3), for example) like contest success
functions (see Skaperdas (5)). A fuller literature review is not presented here in the interest
of space and with the view to keeping the paper short.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model, section 3 presents
the narrative evidence and section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. The Basic Conflict Model. We first outline the basic Hirshleifer (2) set-up and then
compare it with the augmented model in the next subsection. Two players are contending
each other to divide some aggregate output. Specifically, player i = 1, 2, must divide its
exogenously given resource Ri, i = 1, 2, between productive effort Ei and fighting effort Fi,
such that Ei + Fi = Ri, i = 1, 2. The productive technology is summarised by an Aggregate
Production Function that combines efforts E1 and E2 to generate aggregate output that is
up for divide between the players. Let the Aggregate Production Function be given by3:
(1) I = A(E1 + E2).
Hence the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. And A is the technological
productivity factor - with technical progress, as inputs become more productive, A increases.
3In Hirshleifer (2), the formulation is I = A(E
1/s
1
+E
1/s
2
)s. Hence the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution. However, in the analytical solution arrived at
thereafter and analysed, s is assumed to be 1, an assumption we make right at the outset.
4The technology of conflict is laid down by the Contest Success Functions (CSFs), that
translate the fighting efforts to the distributive shares p1 and p2, given as follows
4:
p1 =
Fm1
Fm1 + F
m
2
,(2)
p2 =
Fm2
Fm1 + F
m
2
,(3)
such that p1+ p2 = 1. Finally, the incomes accruing to the two contending players are given
by
I1 = p1I,(4)
I2 = p2I.(5)
Hence all generated income falls into a common pool and is up for grabs by the players,
according to the CSFs.
Player 1’s problem is thus to: max I1 subject to E1 + F1 = R1. Similarly for player 2.
Assuming interior solutions and equal resource endowments (R1 = R2), the symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium (where F1 = F2), say FH (H denoting the basic Hirshleifer set-
up), would be given by:
(6) F1 = F2 = FH =
Rm
1 +m
,
where R = R1 +R2.
2.2. The Conflict Model Under a Pandemic. We augment this standard Hirshleifer
setup to include possible repercussions of a raging pandemic. At the risk of overly gen-
eralising several complexities, conflict under a pandemic can potentially pose two kinds of
externality - positive and negative. Negative externality involves any and all kind of spread
of disease in one’s own territory that are brought about by engagement with one’s opponent
(and appropriation of an aggregate, part of which is contributed by the opponent). On the
other hand, since the opponent also suffers from the same fate of having to cope with the
disease and has possibly invested in medical supplies etc. in fighting the disease, appropri-
ation of its resources would mean gaining access to some of those as well. In other words,
other than what usual conflict involved, there is now the possibility of both a good and a
bad spillover occurring - one is likely to appropriate the virus as well as the means to fight
it. We model this as follows.
4Such contest success functions have been widely used in the conflict literature, see for example, Skaperdas
(5).
52.2.1. Positive externality. Let each player, other than investing their resources into E and
F , additionally now have to invest in D (say, doctors, medicines, medical supplies, R&D to
research labs to develop vaccines, etc.). In other words, investments in D does not lead to
increase in distributive probabilities (p), nor does to translate into additional income (I),
and hence, for modelling purposes, count in as neither F nor E. That is D, represents a
third channel in which investments now have to be made, necessitated, say, by a medical
emergency such as a pandemic. Let Di, i = 1, 2, be the investments made in this regard
by the two players. Utility depends positively on D, and for simplicity we assume that it
enters the utility function linearly. That is, if 1 employs D1 number of doctors say, utility
increases exactly by that amount. Investing in D1 however, is costly and costs are given by
some standard cost function (increasing and convex), C, which is assumed to be the same
for both he countries, and which represents a deduction in utility.
2.2.2. Negative externality. Moreover let V1 be the ‘amount’ of virus-infected in player 1’s
territory and V2 be the same in player 2’s territory. Nobody likes infection and hence they
contribute strictly negatively to each country’s utility. We assume these are given for a
player, since if not, each country would optimally choose 0 ‘amount’ of infection.
2.2.3. Utility Function. Hence, let the utility function that accrues to player 1, be as follows:
U1 = I1 +D1 + p1α1D2 − C(D1)− V1 − p1β1V2(7)
= p1(I + α1D2 − β1V2) +D1 − C(D1)− V1.(8)
where I1 is as given in (4). Reiterating, we specifically make the model amenable to a
pandemic situation, by introducing an externality/spill-over in the utilities of the two op-
ponents. The idea can be motivated as follows: if one of the countries do very well in
fighting the pandemic, then the benefits spill over to the opponent too. For example, if
a country employs many doctors, develop indigenous technologies to supply masks, gloves,
PPEs (Personal Protective Equipments), ventilators etc., then in the event of a neighbour
appropriating its income/resources, it will also enjoy the benefits of the investments made
in this front, possibly at a different rate, say α. Specifically, with probability p1, player 1,
not only captures income I (as in the basic conflict model) but also D2 (2’s investments in
doctors etc.) at the rate α1. Here α1 can be interpreted to be the efficiency with which 1
can actually utilise 2’s resources/investments in D. Similarly, 1 is also likely to appropriate
some of the virus cases from 2, at the rate of β1, with the probability of p1. Hence β1V2
is the total amount of transmission/affected in some sense and 1 is likely to contract p1
fraction of it. In other words, country 1 appropriates β1V2 amount of total transmission
with probability p1.
62.2.4. Optimisation. Assuming C(Di) = D
2
i
/2, i = 1, 2, substituting for the CSFs, and
assuming, interior optima, the FOCs for player 1 are given by:
AF1(F
m
1 + F
m
2 ) = mF
m
2 (A(E1 + E2) + α1D2 − β1V2);(9)
D1 +
Fm1
Fm1 + F
m
2
A = 1.(10)
Similarly, those of player 2 are given by:
AF2(F
m
1 + F
m
2 ) = mF
m
1 (A(E1 + E2) + α2D1 − β2V1);(11)
D2 +
Fm2
Fm1 + F
m
2
A = 1.(12)
From equations (9) and (11), we get,
AF1(F
m
1 + F
m
2 )
mFm2
− α1D2 + β1V2 =
AF2(F
m
1 + F
m
2 )
mFm1
− α2D1 + β2V1.
As in the Hirshleifer model, here too there is no convenient general solution to the above
equation. Hirshleifer assumed equality of endowments, R1 = R2, to arrive at the symmetric
solution given in (6). In our case however, we do not need equality of resources - instead
we need α1 = α2 and β1V2 = β2V1, for there to be a symmetric solution. Hence, let
α1 = α2 = α and β1V2 = β2V1 = T (total transmission). Then F1 = F2 = FP (where P
indicates pandemic) is a solution to the FOCs. And at these values, D1 = D2 = 1 − A/2.
Solving, we get the following fighting effort during a pandemic (FP ):
(13) FP =
m
2(m+ 1)
[
R+
(
1−
A
2
)(α
2
− 2
)
−
T
A
]
.
The following proposition summarises:
Proposition 1. Assuming interior optima, and letting α1 = α2 = α, β1V2 = β2V1 = T ,
the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the conflict model under a pandemic (in section
2.2) are given by the following:
F1 = F2 = FP =
m
2(m+ 1)
[
R+
(
1−
A
2
)(α
2
− 2
)
−
T
A
]
;(14)
D1 = D2 = D = 1−
A
2
.(15)
Observation 1. Note that since D1 = D2 = D > 0 (being investments in doctors, medicines
etc.), we must have A < 2. That is, the technological progress factor is constrained at 2. In
other words, there cannot be great productivity increases (technological progress, that more
than doubles output given productive efforts, is ruled out). Moreover the only parameter it
depends on is A and ∂D
∂A
< 0. That is D depends negatively on technological advancement.
We can interpret this as follows: As technology progresses, investment in E’s (and F ’s, as
we will see in observation (3) below) becomes more attractive and that in D falls.
7Observation 2. As with the fighting efforts in Hirshleifer’s model (given in (6)), fighting
efforts in the pandemic model, also increases as m, the decisiveness parameter5, increases.
That is, we can compute ∂FP
∂m
> 0.
Observation 3. Fighting efforts in Hirshleifer’s model (6) does not depend on aggregate pro-
ductivity factor A. He concludes therefore that an “increase in overall economic productivity
leaves the proportionate allocation of resources between producing and fighting unchanged.
Intuitively, an increase in A raises the marginal profitability of productive activity and of
conflictual activity in the same proportion.” (Pg. 181, Hirshleifer (2))
However, that is not true in the case of fighting efforts in the pandemic model. Here, we get
(16)
∂FP
∂A
=
m
2(m+ 1)
[
1 +
1
A2
(T − α)
]
,
which is > 0 for T > α, which is likely to be true. Hence fighting efforts are likely to increase
with increase in technological productivity increases. This is because, unlike in the basic
model, here there are other avenues of investment of resources and increase in productivity
possibly increases the stakes for grabs in these avenues as well and hence the increase in
efforts to capture them.
Observation 4. Again as with the fighting efforts in Hirshleifer’s model (6), fighting efforts
in the pandemic model, also increases as R, aggregate resources, increase. That is, ∂FP
∂R
> 0.
Hence as aggregate resources to be appropriated increase, the fighting efforts also increase.
Observation 5. Interestingly and as expected, ∂FP
∂T
< 0, since part of the affected gets
transmitted, fighting efforts actually decrease as total transmission T increases, a fallout of
the negative externality of the pandemic.
Observation 6. Again pertaining to the externality of the pandemic, ∂FP
∂α
> 0, where α
represents the positive externality of the pandemic. That is, expectedly again, when the
rate of getting benefitted from appropriation increases, fighting efforts increase.
Note that observations (5) and (6) particularly refer to the effect of externalities of the
pandemic on fighting efforts.
5“On the one hand the rich can afford to devote more effort to fighting, on the other hand the poor are
motivated to fight harder.” (Pg 184, Hirshleifer (2)) The decisiveness parameter m determines the balance
between the two influences. Please refer to Hirshleifer (2) for details.
82.3. Comparing fighting efforts from Hirshleifer’s model and the pandemic model:
Comparing FH and FP , we find that
(17) FP =
1
2
FH +
m
2(m+ 1)
[(
1−
A
2
)(α
2
− 2
)
−
T
A
]
.
A priori, it is not obvious how FH and FP compare. Algebraic simplification yields the
following condition:
FH >=< FP(18)
⇐⇒ R >=<
(2−A)(α− 2A)
2A
−
T
A
.(19)
Observation 7. As T tends to ∞, R > RHS of (21) always holds. In other words, as the
total transmission from opponents becomes astronomically large, players will refrain from
increasing fighting (relative to pre-pandemic Hirshleifer’s levels).
Observation 8. Similarly, as A tends to 2 (it cannot exceed 2 by observation 1), R > RHS
of (21) always holds. In other words, in possibly highly technologically advanced nations
(where increase in inputs is likely to increase output by almost double), investments are more
likely to be in productive uses rather than in fighting during a pandemic, and so players
again refrain from increasing fighting relative to pre-pandemic levels.
Observation 9. Again, for given values of T and A, if R is very large, in that case too
R > RHS of (21) is likely to hold. Recall R = R1 + R2. Hence both countries rich in
endowments or at least one of them so, is also unlikely to push fighting efforts higher than
pre-pandemic levels.
Observation 10. In fact if α = 0, that is there is no positive spillover from contest, then
R > RHS of (21) will always hold, and in which case, FH > FP . That is, if there is no
positive externality in conflict, that is there is no positive repercussion in appropriating one’s
opponent’s resources, then conflict should fall with pandemic.
Hence observations 7, 8, 9, 10, lay down conditions under which conflicts are likely to fall
with a pandemic and we see that the conditions are very likely to be fulfilled. In fact, we
see de-escalation of several conflicts in the world which can potentially be explained through
this channel (see section 3 below). However for moderate values of R, T,A, it is possible that
R < RHS of (21) holds, in which case, we are likely to see an increase in fighting efforts
under a pandemic situation. We depict the inequality regions in Figure 1.
To gain a different perspective on the intuition behind change in fighting efforts, let us
rewrite condition (21) keeping T on LHS, to get the following inequality:
FH >=< FP(20)
⇐⇒ T >=<
(2−A)(α− 2A)
2
−AR.(21)
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FH = FP
2(T+A(2−A))
2−A
−(2−A)− T
A
FH > FP
FH < FP
Figure 1. Fighting Efforts in the R− α plane
R
T
FH = FP
(2−A)(α−2A)
2
(2−A)(α−2A)
2A
FH > FP
Figure 2. Fighting Efforts in the R− T plane when α < 2A
Now, if α < 2A, then FH > FP for all positive T and R, as depicted in Figure 2. That
is, fighting efforts fall with the onset of pandemic when the rate of positive spillover of the
pandemic is relatively small (relative to the rate of technological progress in some sense).
On the other hand, if α > 2A, then at relatively low values of R and T , FP > FH while
for higher values of both, FH > FP . This is depicted in Figure 3. That is, fighting efforts
may actually increase with the onset of pandemic when the rate of positive spillover of the
10
R
T
FH = FP
(2−A)(α−2A)
2
(2−A)(α−2A)
2A
FH > FP
FH < FP
Figure 3. Fighting Efforts in the R− T plane when α > 2A
pandemic is relatively high (relative to the rate of technological progress). But when the
pandemic worsens, and for relatively large enough R, post-pandemic conflict levels should
again fall relative to pre-pandemic levels.
Hence the general conclusion more or less from all the observations above seem to be that
conflict levels are likely to ameliorate and mitigate post-pandemic rather than increase,
proving the apprehensions of many a scholar and diplomat, not quite correct.
3. Narrative Evidence
Evoking the “potentially devastating impact of Covid-19 in Idlib and else-
where in Syria,” the UN undersecretary-general for political affairs, Rose-
mary DiCarlo, called on Twitter for all parties to show restraint. “If anyone
- incredibly - still needed a reason to stop the fighting there,” she added,
“this is it.”6
Despite apprehensions and rhetorics, in most cases, conflict is likely to have decreased or
at least remained the same, and not increase with the pandemic. For a vast majority of
parametric values, as predicted by the model, we should see that conflict is likely to remain
same or decrease post-pandemic, rather than increase, which is what we see from journalistic
accounts of conflict situations around the world. We look at two of them somewhat more
closely - conflict in Yemen and the India-China standoff.
6Ibid reference in footnote (1).
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3.1. Conflict in Yemen: Many scholars, specifically in the context of Yemen (see Yu¨ksel
(6), for example), had apprehended an increase in internal conflict and increased foreign
interference during a pandemic situation. However that is not what we see in reality. Let
us look at the conflict in Yemen closely to see how conflicts have fallen post-pandemic.
Background of Yemen. Inspite of being resource-rich, Yemen is one of the poorest countries
of the world7. More than 80 percent (2018) of the population lives in poverty and it ranks
165th (nominal, 2018) according to GDP per capita. At the time of writing this essay, the
number of Corona affected in the country is 1,2408 (which is small compared to the affected
in other countries). However, it is engaged in conflict with a Saudi-Arab led coalition, and
the latter is a rich country9. And the number of Corona affected in the country is about 2
lakh10. Recall R in our theoretical model is the sum of the resources of the two conflicting
players. Hence the parameter values that are most likely to be applicable to this case would
be a high R, low A, moderate T (β1V2 ≈ β2V1) and almost close to 0 α (since it is basically
defending itself against Saudi-led attacks as described below). In any case, since the RHS
of (21) is likely to be negative and R > 0, hence we should expect conflicts to at least not
rise. And this is what we see in reality.
Civil War in Yemen. Yemen has been reeling under conflicts for decades11 and faces one
of the worst humanitarian crises. The civil war has internally displaced and killed several
thousand people12. The Iran-Saudi rivalry has also intensified over Yemen. Recently, in
March, just around the spread of the Corona pandemic Yemen expressed their desire for a
mutually acceptable ceasefire, followed by a ceasefire declaration from a Saudi-led alliance
in April 2020.
History. The main conflict in Yemen is between the UN-recognised government of Mansour
Hadi, supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Iranian-
backed Houthis. The Houthis belong to the Zaydi sect of Shias, which constitute nearly 40
per cent of the Yemeni population. The Zaydis had ruled over Northern Yemen for almost
a millennium before being overthrown in a coup in 1962. For next three decades, the Zaydis
7It contains oil and gas resources and has productive soil. See Wikipedia webpage ‘Economy of Yemen’
https : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EconomyofY emen (Accessed on July 6 2020).
8See https : //www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/yemen/.
9Refer to Wikipedia webpage ‘Economy of Saudi Arabia’ at https :
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EconomyofSaudiArabia (Accessed on July 6 2020).
10See https : //www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/saudi− arabia/
11Please refer to the article “Conflict in Yemen amid COVID-19 Pandemic” by Meena Singh Roy and
Prabhat Jawla (24 April 2020) available at https : //idsa.in/idsacomments/yemen− covid− 19−msroy−
pjwala− 240420 (Accessed on 6th July 2020), for details.
12According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Over 80 per cent have been
displaced for more than a year.” In 2019, the death toll in Yemen had reached 100,000 since the war began
five years ago, which includes 12,000 civilian casualties, as per the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project (ACLED).
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who wera at the top of the social order were marginalised both politically and economically
by the government. Finally Mohammad Badr al-Din Houthi along with Muhammad Izzan
started the Ansar Allah movement which carried out extensive military campaigns during
2002-09 in the hope of securing greater political participation.
The Houthis captured capital Sanaa in September 2014 and placed President Mansour Hadi
under house arrest. In January 2015, President Hadi resigned and escaped to Saudi Arabia,
where he pleaded to the international community to restore his elected government in Yemen.
As a result, in March 2015, an alliance led by Saudi Arabia and UAE and comprising of
several other Arab countries, with logistics and intelligence support from the US, commenced
the military campaign against the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen.
Yemen has also become the centre-stage of the theatrics Saudi-Iran rivalry. The Saudi-
led Operation Decisive Storm, often dubbed as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Salmans
war, commenced in 2015 with massive bombing campaigns and naval blockade, and it was
probably believed that it could securely reinstate Mansour Hadis government in Sanaa.
Instead, Iran has supported the Houthis and they have put up a strong defence, prolonging
the conflict with a continuous military stalemate in various provinces13.
COVID-19 in Yemen. In an already war-torn country, bloody with decades of civil war, the
advent of COVID-19 has thrown life and preparations completely haywire. Moreover the
US and World Food Programme have recently announced a cut in healthcare aid and other
kinds of aid to Yemen owing to budgetary constraints, which are likely to affect several
Houthi-controlled areas. Also the Donald Trump administration’s move to halt funding to
WHO would severely undermine WHO’s efforts in Yemen. The UN Secretary-General has
called for an “immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world” and made an appeal
“to put armed conflict on lockdown and focus together on the true fight” of human lives.
COVID-19: UN chief calls for a global ceasefire to focus on the true fight of our lives, UN
News, March 23, 2020 (Accessed April 17, 2020).
Driven by the seriousness of the crisis, the Saudi-led coalition14 announced a two-week
ceasefire on April 09. Houthis welcome the move but is somewhat suspect and wants more
guarantee from the UN. Despite the declaration of a “comprehensive ceasefire” by Saudi
Arabia, Tehran is yet to make an official statement on the issue. However, given the impact
of COVID-19 pandemic in Iran and its sanctions hit economy, it is unlikely that Tehran
would have sufficient resources to actively stay involved in the Yemeni conflict. Riyadh too
13The Saudi-Iran conflict has also been dubbed as a Shia-Sunni conflict or proxy war. Over the last five
years, Saudi Arabia has carried out extensive military campaigns that has only emboldened the Iranian
support to Houthis - Iran is now said to facilitate the shipment of small arms to include heavy artillery,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and even small range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).
14The coalition includes UAE and Oman siding with Saudi-Arabia.
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is exhausted with the war and deeply affected by falling oil prices in addition to its internal
political problems. In such a situation, Riyadh may look for an honourable exit from Yemens
war theatre. It can be argued that under present circumstances, both Iran and Saudi Arabia
have sufficient number of reasons to make the ceasefire work15.
Undoubtedly, the ceasefire is a welcome development, but there are some serious doubts
about the effectiveness of the ceasefire. Since 2015, the Yemeni conflict had been a saga of
ceasefires and their relentless violations. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that this time it
is going to be any different unless both sides adhere to it. However, the malaise of COVID-19
a common concern for all in the region may be a reason for some optimism.
3.2. India-China Conflict: Here we look at the India-China standoff, especially in the
context of the recent flash point pertaining to the control of the Galwan valley16.
The neighbouring armies of India and China are engaged in the standoff in eastern Ladakh.
And they are locked in a standoff, not just for territorial gains on land, but enhanced
domination of the northern bank of Pangong Tso, a resource-rich lake. Pangong Tso or
Pangong Lake is a lake in the Himalayas, and extends from India to the Tibetan Autonomous
Region, China, where approximately 60% of the length of the lake lies within the Tibetan
Autonomous Region. The lake is in disputed territory. The Line of Actual Control (LAC)
passes through the lake. A section of the lake approximately 20 km east from the Line of
Actual Control is controlled by China but claimed by India.
The standoff at Ladakhs Galwan Valley has escalated in recent weeks due to the infrastruc-
ture projects that India has undertaken in the recent years. India is building a strategic road
through the Galwan Valley - close to China - connecting the region to an airstrip. China is
opposed to any Indian construction in the area17.
15The cooperation of UAE, a partner of Riyadh in the coalition, would be equally crucial. The UAE, like
Saudi Arabia, too seeks to end its direct military involvement in the conflict. In March, UAE had sent
medical supplies to Iran amid the coronavirus crisis, followed by an official call between the foreign ministers
of the two countries.26 This signals a positive development that might serve as an opportunity for Tehran
and Riyadh to bridge gaps through Abu Dhabi.
16Please refer to “Galwan Valley Clash”, June 29, 2020, https : //www.drishtiias.com/daily −
updates/daily − news − editorials/galwan − valley − clash; (Accessed on 5th July 2020) and “Pangong
Tso”, Wikipedia, https : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PangongT so; (Accessed on 5th July 2020), for many of
the facts in this discussion.
17The border, or Line of Actual Control, is not demarcated, and both the countries differ in their perceptions
of the line, leading to regular border “transgressions.” Often these don’t escalate tensions and a serious
standoff like the current one is uncommon, though not unseen - this is the fourth since 2013. Both countries
troops have patrolled this region for decades, as the 2,200-mile border has long been contested, including
leading to war in 1962.
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Recently however, diplomatic talks have yielded positive results and we see disengagement
of troops by by India and China along the LAC, further corroborating the overall prediction
of the model of lowering of conflict levels post-pandemic18.
4. Conclusion
“At a time when the world is struggling to fight a pandemic, the focus of
the parties must shift away from fighting one another to ensuring that the
population will not face even graver risks.”
(Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy for Yemen;
Ibid reference in footnote (1)).
Inspite of worldwide apprehension of an exacerbation of conflicts post-pandemic, given lack
of monitoring and probable interventions by world organisation, we see, in many cases, that
conflicts have actually fall. Above, we give examples of Yemen and the India-China standoff.
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia-led coalition of countries, that has been locked in conflict with the
Houthis in Yemen for the last five years, has called a ceasefire. In the India-China standoff,
after an initial show of hostilities, troops have started disengaging from the border in a
significant de-escalation of conflict. If there is any remotely positive aspect of a pandemic
of such proportions, it is probably in the slight amelioration of conflicts worldwide.
In this paper, we theoretically explore the possible effects of a pandemic on conflict by
augmenting a standard conflict model with externalities. We look at parametric restrictions
that would ascertain whether conflict is likely to gain momentum or lose so in when faced
with a pandemic. We find that in a large number of cases, conflict is likely to fall, while in
relatively smaller circumstance, it is likely to rise.
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